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SMU LAW REVIEW
his Article details significant developments in the area of state
criminal procedure during the Survey period. The Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals issued a number of important decisions,
although most clarified prior decisions of the Court concerning criminal
procedure. A discussion of the procedural aspects of confession, search,
and seizure law is not included, as those subjects are addressed elsewhere
in the Survey.
I. LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURAL CHANGES
Of the 5,500 bills considered by the end of the 75th Legislative session,
approximately 130 changes were made to the Penal Code (substantive
criminal law) and to the Code of Criminal Procedure. Several procedural
changes addressed time constraints.
A. TIME LIMITS
Procedural changes designed to hasten consideration of death penalty
cases continue. An application for writ of habeas corpus in such cases
must be filed no later than 180 days after appointment of counsel, or no
more than forty-five days after the date that appellee's original brief is
filed on direct appeal.1 For the first time, the State is required to answer
the application for a writ of habeas corpus no more than thirty days after
the state receives notice of the writ.2 Furthermore, the parties must now
submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law,3 and, if re-
quested by the appellate court, the presiding judge of the convicting court
must issue findings of fact and conclusions of law. 4
Continuing a trend to enlarge statutes of limitations, particularly with
respect to sexual offenses, limitations applicable to certain sexual offenses
against children were extended to ten years from the date of the victim's
eighteenth birthday. 5
The period within which an indictment or information must be
presented in order to avoid dismissal of the pending charge against a de-
fendant is 180 days or, with the recent change in the law, within two terms
of the grand jury.6 This effectively extended the time within which to
present an indictment.
1. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.071, § 4(a) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
2. See id. art. 11.071, § 7(a).
3. See id. art. 11.071, § 8(b) (where the court has determined that no controverted,
unresolved factual issues material to the applicant's confinement exist); id. art. 11.071,
§ 9(e) (where such issues do exist).
4. See id. art. 11.071, § 8(c) (findings without an evidentiary hearing); id. § 9(e) (fol-
lowing evidentiary hearing).
5. See id. art. 12.01(5). These offenses are indecency with a child (TEX. PEN. CODE
ANN. § 21.11(a)(1) (Vernon 1989)); sexual assault or aggravated sexual assault of a child
(TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. §§ 22.011(a)(2), 22.021(a)(1)(B) (Vernon 1989)).
6. An indictment or information must be presented by the next term of court or
within 180 days (whichever period is longer). Otherwise the charge must be dismissed and
bail discharged. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 32.01 (Vernon Supp. 1998). A
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Courts may now extend the period of community supervision in misde-
meanor cases an additional two years beyond the three-year limit if the
defendant has failed to pay fines, costs, or restitution, and the court deter-
mines that payment is likely to be made if community supervision is
extended.7
For certain sexual offenses, the court may impose a one-time extension
of community supervision an additional ten years if, following a hearing,
the court finds "the defendant has not sufficiently demonstrated a com-
mitment to avoid future criminal behavior and that the release of the
defendant from supervision would endanger the public. .... ,,8
B. OTHER LEGISLATIVE CHANGES
Deferred adjudication is no longer permitted for certain sexual offenses
unless the court makes a finding that deferred adjudication is "in the best
interest of the victim." 9 A defendant previously charged with any of
these sexual offenses and placed on community supervision is ineligible to
receive deferred adjudication for these offenses. 10
Mandatory community supervision for state jail felonies has been abol-
ished.1' The court now has discretion either to suspend the sentence (un-
less the defendant has a prior felony conviction), 12 or to order that the
sentence be carried out. Furthermore, the court may impose a minimum
term of 90 to 180 days in a state jail as a condition of supervision. 13
It is now clear that a defendant in a misdemeanor case may waive trial
by jury regardless of whether he is represented by counsel at the time of
the waiver. 14 In felony cases, however, the court must appoint an attor-
ney to represent the defendant before he may waive his right to a jury
trial. 15
In a significant change that may herald a change in court proceedings
of the future, the Code of Criminal Procedure now permits a court to
accept a plea or waiver of the defendant's rights by closed-circuit televi-
sion, provided that both the defendant and the State consent in writing to
this procedure.' 6 This procedure is acceptable, however, only if simulta-
neous full motion video and interactive communication are provided.
17
defendant released for this reason may be rearrested for the same conduct only upon pres-
entation of a new indictment or information. See id. art. 15.14.
7. See id. art. 42.12, § 22(c).
8. Id. art. 42.12, § 22A(a).
9. Id. art. 42.12, § 5(a). The sexual offenses covered are indecent exposure, inde-
cency with a child, sexual assault, aggravated sexual assault, aggravated kidnapping with
intent to commit sexual abuse, burglary with intent to commit a sexual offense, sexual
performance by a child, or child pornography.
10. See id.
11. See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 12.35(a) (Vernon 1989).
12. See id.
13. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, § 15(d) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
14. See id. art. 1.13(c).
15. See id.
16. See id. art. 27.18.
17. See id. art. 27.18(a)(2).
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Moreover, the defendant and his attorney must be able to communicate
privately without being overheard or recorded.18
A novel privilege has been created which protects the confidential
communications between the survivor of a sexual assault and the sexual
assault advocate. 19 The privilege against disclosure does not apply, how-
ever, if the information embodied in the confidential communication is
used in a "criminal investigation or proceeding in response to a subpoena
issued in accordance with law."'20
Polygraph examinations were addressed by the 75th Legislature. If a
prosecutor or peace officer requests that a complainant take a polygraph
examination, the complainant must be informed that neither refusal to do
so nor polygraph results, without more, will result in dismissal of the com-
plaint. 2' Prosecutors and officers may not require a complainant who
seeks to charge a person with certain sexual offenses to undergo a poly-
graph examination.22
An interesting change to the Open Records Act2 3 limits the exemption
from disclosure previously accorded records "maintained for internal use
in matters relating to law enforcement or prosecution. ' 24 Such informa-
tion is now protected only when: (1) the State can show that disclosure
would interfere with law enforcement or prosecution of crime; (2) the
information relates to an investigation that did not result in a conviction
or deferred adjudication; or (3) the information was prepared by the
State's attorney and constitutes attorney work product.2 5
Of utmost importance is the imposition, for the first time, of a good
faith requirement regarding pleadings and motions filed by a defendant.2 6
Motions and pleadings must be signed by an attorney of record, or the
defendant if he is pro se.27 This signature constitutes a certification that
the person has read the document, that it is not brought in bad faith, is
not groundless, and is not brought for purposes of harassment, unneces-
sary delay or any other improper purpose.2 8 If the document is not
signed, the court is required to strike it unless the signature omission is
promptly cured.29 One who files a fictitious pleading for an improper
18. See id. art. 27.18(a)(3).
19. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. art. 44.071 (Vernon Supp. 1998). "An
individual may act as an advocate for survivors of sexual assault if the individual has com-
pleted a sexual assault training program certified by the department and: (1) is employed
by a sexual assault program; or (2) provides services through a sexual assault program as a
volunteer under the supervisor." Id.
20. Id. art. 44.074.
21. See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. §§ 15.051(b), (c) and (d).
22. See id. § 15.051(a) (referring to crimes described in TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 21.11(indecency with a child); § 22.011 (sexual assault); § 22.021 (aggravated sexual assault); and
§ 25.02 (incest) (Vernon 1994 & Supp. 1998).
23. See id. § 552.001 et seq. (Vernon 1994).
24. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 552.008(b) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
25. See id. § 552.108(b).
26. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROc. ANN. art. 1.052 (Vernon Supp. 1998).
27. See id. art. 1.052(a).
28. See id. art. 1.052(b).
29. See id. art. 1.052(c).
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purpose or makes a statement that the person knows to be groundless
and false in order to obtain a delay or for purpose of harassment "shall be
held guilty of contempt."' 30 If a pleading or motion is signed in violation
of this article, the court, after notice and hearing, "shall impose an appro-
priate sanction" which may include payment of costs incurred as a conse-
quence of the filing, including reasonable attorney's fees.31 The court is
to presume that the document is filed in good faith and may impose sanc-
tions only for good cause. 32 "Groundless" is defined as "without basis in
law or fact and not warranted by a good faith argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law."'33
It is now clear that justice of the peace courts have original jurisdiction
in criminal cases where the punishment authorized does not require
confinement.34
Victim-offender mediation programs received recognition and the po-
tential imprimatur of the court. Before acceptance of a plea of guilty or
nolo contendere, and upon request of the victim, the court may assist the
victim and the defendant in participating in a mediation program.35
II. DEATH PENALTY CASES
During the Survey period, appeals in death penalty cases continued to
receive considerable attention from the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
which consistently resisted challenges to the State's capital punishment
scheme. In several cases, the Court simply clarified important holdings of
previous cases.
A. JURORS CANNOT BE TOLD WHAT LIFE IMPRISONMENT MEANS
In several decisions, the Court of Criminal Appeals resisted constitu-
tional challenges predicated upon the defendant's inability to question
prospective jurors during voir dire, or to inform the jury during the pun-
ishment phase of trial regarding the parole implications of a life sentence
in a capital case. In a capital case, life imprisonment means at least thirty-
five years actual imprisonment.36 However, the jury may not be in-
formed of that definition.
30. Id. art. 1.052(d).
31. Id. art. 1.052(e).
32. See id. art. 1.052(f).
33. Id. art. 1.052(h).
34. See id. art. 4.11.
35. See id. art. 26.13.
36. For offenses committed prior to September 1, 1991, the imposition of life imprison-
ment in a capital case is the imposition of thirty-five years' imprisonment, and the individ-
ual sentenced to life imprisonment must actually serve thirty-five years before becoming
eligible for parole. After September 1, 1991, the term is forty years before parole eligibility
obtains. A capital murder defendant against whom the state seeks the death penalty is
sentenced to life imprisonment if the jury does not make a finding of future dangerousness,
or finds that mitigation evidence warrants imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment.
See id. art. 37.071, §§ 2(b), 2(e), 2(i).
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In Simmons v. South Carolina,37 the United States Supreme Court held
that a jury must be told of parole eligibility when the prosecution argues
future dangerousness in support of the death penalty.38 The Court of
Criminal Appeals in Eldridge v. State39 reiterated that Simmons does not
require a similar result in Texas, because in Texas, unlike South Carolina,
a life sentence does not mean life without parole. 40 The Supreme Court's
mandate in Simmons was based upon the right to due process of law
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution.4'
The Eldridge decision, however, also indicated that informing juries of
the parole consequences of a life sentence may be required in certain
circumstances. 42 The Court noted that such a requirement "would obtain
only if a defendant has shown other evidence that, in combination with
parole eligibility, tends to show that a capital defendant will not be a fu-
ture danger to society."'43
The Court's unanimous decision in Eldridge is highly significant for its
suggestion that evidence of parole eligibility, while not relevant to future
dangerousness when standing alone, may well be relevant and therefore
admissible in combination with other evidence that would "tend to show
that appellant or people like him and in his position will not 'commit
criminal acts of violence that would pose a continuing threat to soci-
ety.' 44 Thus, an important question is left open by Eldridge-whether
the prohibition against informing jurors of the parole consequences of a
life sentence would be constitutionally infirm when an offer of proof is
made that minimum parole eligibility in combination with other factors
tends to show that the defendant or persons similarly situated would not
pose a continuing threat to society.
The Court in Eldridge did not state what kind of evidence might defeat
the prohibition against informing the jury about the meaning of life im-
prisonment in a capital case, if offered in combination with parole ineligi-
bility for thirty-five or forty years for the capital murder defendant
37. 512 U.S. 154 (1994).
38. See id. at 162.
39. 940 S.W.2d 646, 651 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (en banc).
40. See id. at 651. In this respect, Eldridge simply followed earlier rulings. In Penry v.
State, 903 S.W.2d 715, 764 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) the Court held, "The matter of parole or
a defendant's release thereon is not a proper consideration for a jury's deliberations in the
punishment phase of a capital murder trial.... A jury's only task at the punishment phase
is to answer the special issues as required in Art. 37.071." Id. The Court's plurality opin-
ion in Smith v. State, 898 S.W.2d 838 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (en banc) previously held that
the mandate in Simmons did not apply in Texas. See id. at 849.
41. The Supreme Court in Simmons did not reach the Eighth Amendment argument
presented. See Simmons, 512 U.S. at 154. However, the plurality opinion in Smith held
that the prohibition against disclosure of parole eligibility information to the jury did not
violate the Eighth Amendment. See Smith, 898 S.W.2d at 853.
42. See Eldridge, 940 S.W.2d at 651.
43. Id. (citing Willingham v. State, 897 S.W.2d 351, 359 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995)).
44. Id. at 651 (citing TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071, § 2(b)(1) (Vernon
Supp. 1998)).
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receiving a life sentence. 45 It was unnecessary to reach the question there
because appellant offered no such evidence. The precise language used
by the Court is instructive. The Court expressly refers to evidence re-
garding the defendant or one in his position.46 Imposition of a sentence
of life imprisonment upon a twenty-five year old defendant would mean
that the defendant would be ineligible for parole until age sixty or sixty-
five. One must wonder, in light of the Court's caveat in Eldridge,
whether a proffer of evidence that persons in that age bracket are un-
likely to pose a future danger to society is the type of evidence likely to
render parole ineligibility a relevant factor that should be communicated
to the jury.
After its decision in Eldridge, the Court of Criminal Appeals reiterated
its holding that a jury may not be informed about minimum prison terms
in a capital case, without the elaboration given in Eldridge.47 The Court
also repeated its holdings that parole and minimum prison terms are not
proper subjects for voir dire questioning in a capital case in Rhoades v.
State.4 The Court in Rhoades rejected once more the argument that arti-
cle 37.071 is unconstitutional because the jury is not apprised of the mini-
mum mandatory sentence involved in the imposition of a life sentence in
a capital case.49 The Court also rejected the argument that prohibition of
voir dire questioning on this issue violated the accused's Sixth Amend-
ment right to the effective assistance of counsel. 50 In rejecting appellant's
claim, the Court noted that the mere global incantation of the Sixth
Amendment was insufficient to raise the constitutional issue, requiring
counsel to cite specific legal authority and to argue it in support of such a
proposition.51
B. MITIGATION SPECIAL ISSUE
The Court of Criminal Appeals continued to resist constitutional chal-
lenges based upon alleged deficiencies in the consideration of mitigating
evidence. In several cases, defendants convicted of capital murder and
sentenced to death challenged the constitutionality of article 37.071.
In Moore v. State52 and Eldridge v. State,53 the Court rejected constitu-
tional challenges that the absence of appellate review of the mitigation
special issue permitted an arbitrary and capricious imposition of the
death penalty, in violation of the principles enunciated in Furman v.
45. See id. at 651.
4( See id.
47. See Cantu v. State, 939 S.W.2d 627, 632 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (en banc).




52. 935 S.W.2d 124, 128 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (en banc).
53. See supra note 39.
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Georgia.54 In Eldridge55 and in Cantu,56 the Court observed that mitigat-
ing evidence is not objectively defined and is deliberately left to the sub-
jective standards of the jury.57 Thus, appellate review of the jury's
decision on the mitigation special issue is "impossible. '5 8 The Court, as
had been done in the past, accordingly declined to review the jury's deci-
sion on the mitigation special issue, deferring to the jury's "unfettered"
discretion as long as the jury "has all potentially relevant evidence before
it. . . . 59
In Eldridge, the appellant also challenged the constitutionality of arti-
cle 37.071, section 2(e) for failure to provide appellate review on the
ground that article 44.251 on its face requires appellate review of the
jury's determinations. 60 While conceding that article 44.251 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure seems to require appellate review of the suffi-
ciency of the evidence to support a negative answer to the special issue
posed by article 37.071, section 2(e), the Court nevertheless concluded
that "we cannot take the statute to mean what it plainly says."'6 1 The
Court reasoned that a genuine sufficiency review of a jury's negative an-
swer to the mitigation special issue would be "a logical absurdity. ' 62 No
evidence is mitigating as a matter of law, the Court concluded. 63 Accord-
ingly, it is not possible to review the jury's normative judgment in answer-
ing the mitigation special issue.64 The Court distinguished review of guilt
and innocence determinations, as well as the jury's conclusion regarding
future dangerousness, as "decisions [that] are fact-bound and hence re-
viewable for sufficiency of the evidence, ' 65 whereas no sufficiency review
is possible with respect to the jury's "normative judgment" about the mit-
igation special issue. 66
54. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
55. See Eldridge, 940 S.W.2d at 651-653.
56. See Cantu, 939 S.W.2d at 639-641.
57. See Eldridge, 940 S.W.2d at 651-53; Cantu, 939 S.W.2d at 639-41.
58. Eldridge, 940 S.W.2d at 651.
59. Id. at 652.
60. In pertinent part, article 44.251(a) requires the Court of Criminal Appeals to re-
form a sentence of death to a sentence of life imprisonment if there is insufficient evidence
to support a negative answer to the mitigation special issue. The special issue of mitigation
is submitted to the jury if it makes an affirmative finding of future dangerousness, that is,
"whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence
that would constitute a continuing threat to society;" and where the court's charge permit-
ted conviction of a defendant as a party, "whether the defendant actually caused the
death" or, if not, "intended to kill the deceased or another or anticipated that a human life
would be taken." TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071, § 2(b) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
The special issue then presented is whether taking into consideration all of the evidence,
including the circumstances of the offense, the defendant's character and background and
the personal moral culpability of the defendant, there is a sufficient mitigating circum-
stance or circumstances to warrant that a sentence of life imprisonment rather than the
death penalty be imposed. Id. § 2(e).
61. Eldridge, 940 S.W.2d at 652.
62. Id.
63. See id.
64. See id. at 653.
65. Id. at 652.
66. Id. at 653.
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C. VICTIM IMPACT EVIDENCE
In Johnson v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals sought to clarify and
reconcile various decisions concerning the admissibility of victim impact
evidence at the punishment phase of a capital murder trial.67 Since that
decision is pending on rehearing, it of course is subject to revision or
withdrawal.
In Payne v. Tennessee, the Supreme Court held that there is no per se
Eighth Amendment bar to victim impact evidence, leaving to the states
questions regarding appropriate and admissible victim impact evidence.68
The Court in Payne acknowledged the state's legitimate interest in
counteracting a defendant's mitigating evidence by demonstrating the in-
dividuality of the victim, just as mitigating evidence may demonstrate the
uniqueness of the capital murder defendant.69
In Johnson, the appellant argued that the court's various rulings were
ambiguous and implicitly inconsistent.70 In Ford v. State, victim impact
evidence from the immediate family and surviving victims was allowed. 71
In Smith v. State, good character evidence regarding the victim was
deemed inadmissible because such evidence encourages a "comparative
judgment" about the worth of victims. 72 In Goff v. State, evidence of the
deceased's homosexuality was excluded at trial as irrelevant, and the
Court of Criminal Appeals upheld this determination. 73 In Janecka v.
State, victim impact testimony was offered by a judge who was not related
to the victim, and the Court of Criminal Appeals deemed the testimony
irrelevant and inadmissible. 74
Perceiving a need, in light of the foregoing authorities, to enunciate
appropriate criteria for the admission of victim impact evidence, the
Court in Johnson established the following criteria to govern the admis-
sion of victim impact evidence: (1) "the evidence must be relevant to a
special issue during punishment or offered to rebut a defensive punish-
ment theory" at the punishment phase of trial; (2) the probative value
must not be outweighed by the prejudicial effect of the evidence; (3) "the
testimony must come from either a surviving victim" or a family member
or guardian; (4) the evidence must pertain to the impact upon the testify-
ing individual's life; (5) the evidence must not create a "comparative
judgment" situation; (6) "the evidence may not pertain to the character
of the victim" unless it rebuts a defensive theory offered during punish-
ment; and (7) the evidence must not address the value of the individual to
the community. 75
67. See Johnson v. State, No. 72046, 1997 WL 209527 (Tex. Crim. App. April 30, 1997).
68. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991).
69. See id.
70. See Johnson, 1997 WL 209527, at *1.
71. See Ford v. State, 919 S.W.2d 107, 112-16 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (en banc).
72. Smith v. State, 919 S.W.2d 96, 102 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (en banc).
73. See Goff v. State, 931 S.W.2d 537, 555-56 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (en banc).
74. See Janecka v. State, 937 S.W.2d 456, 472-73 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (en banc).
75. Johnson, 1997 WL 209527, at *4.
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In Johnson, the Court also held that the defendant's motions in limine
regarding the character of the deceased and the impact of his death on
the family did not preserve error for appeal.7 6 The Court noted that spe-
cific objection must be made at the time the evidence is offered and that a
general objection to victim impact evidence is insufficient because some
evidence may be admissible even if part of the evidence is not.7 7 The
Court noted that if testimony includes both admissible and inadmissible
aspects, a general objection to the whole does not preserve error, and the
trial court can admit or deny all of the evidence.78
Although victim impact evidence was permitted in the punishment
phase of the trial in Johnson, the defendant's proffered testimony by fam-
ily and friends about the impact his execution would have on them was
excluded at trial.79 Since appellant had created no bill of exceptions, the
Court concluded that it was not possible to assess the propriety of the
proffered testimony since the content of such testimony was unknown.80
Accordingly, the error was not preserved for review. 81
Another interesting aspect of the Johnson decision involves the Court's
having shielded county records from review, invoking the work-product
doctrine. 82 The defendant sought an in-camera review of the county's
capital murder summary sheets for a decade, in order to pursue his claim
that his prosecution was racially motivated. The Court rejected this
claim, invoking the work-product doctrine, a doctrine "vital in assuring
the proper functioning of the criminal justice system. '83
In Cantu v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that it was error
to admit victim impact evidence about a victim not named in the indict-
ment.84 Evidence about the assault was properly admitted at trial be-
cause it arose from the same incident.85 However, the Court concluded
that evidence at the punishment phase about the victim's good character
and the impact on the family was not relevant, since the appellant was not
on trial for her murder.86 Thus, the evidence served "no purpose other
than to inflame the jury."'87 "The danger of unfair prejudice ... is unac-
ceptably high."'88 Notwithstanding the erroneous admission of this partic-
ular victim impact evidence, however, the Court found that the evidence
made no contribution to punishment and was therefore harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt.89
76. See id.
77. See id. at *5.
78. See id.
79. See id. at *8.
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. See id. at *13.
83. Id.
84. See Cantu, 939 S.W.2d at 635-38.




89. See id. at 637-38.
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D. IssuEs DECIDED IN CAPITAL CASES WHICH ALSO APPLY TO NON-
CAPITAL CASES
Relying upon the Supreme Court's decision in Ake v. Oklahoma, which
guaranteed access to expert assistance to indigent defendants, appellants
in several cases argued that such assistance at trial had been unreasonably
denied by the lower courts, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's
guarantee of due process of law.90
In Cantu, the defendant wanted to hire a "scholar" to study jurors and
their understanding of the special punishment issues. 91 Acknowledging
that counsel "shall be reimbursed for reasonable expenses incurred with
prior court approval for purposes of investigative and expert testi-
mony,"'92 the Court emphasized that "access to the raw materials integral
to the building of an effective defense" does not mean "all the assistance
that [the defendant's] wealthier counterparts might buy."' 93 The Court
noted that the appellant had shown "no particularized need for this
study." 94
The request for expert assistance at trial was based upon a study con-
ducted in Illinois that found that jurors did not understand the Illinois
punishment statutes. 95 In that case, the district court held that the statute
unconstitutionally permitted an arbitrary and unguided imposition of the
death penalty.96 However, as the Court noted,97 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit overruled this holding.98 In a previous
decision, the Court of Criminal Appeals rejected a similar argument seek-
ing funds for a jury selection expert. 99
E. SANCTIONS
In an opinion supportive of the State's right to expert psychological
evaluation of a defendant who intends to present expert psychological
testimony, and which also strongly undergirds the trial court's inherent
power to sanction, the Court of Criminal Appeals upheld a severe limita-
tion upon a defendant's psychological expert testimony at trial.100 In
Soria v. State, the defendant's psychological expert was to testify at the
punishment phase of trial. The Court of Criminal Appeals held "that
when the defendant initiates a psychiatric examination and based thereon
presents psychiatric testimony on the issue of future dangerousness, the
trial court may compel an examination of appellant by an expert of the
90. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
91. See Cantu, 939 S.W.2d at 638-39.
92. Id. at 639 (citing TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.05(a) (Vernon 1979)).
93. Id. at 638 (quoting Ake, 470 U.S. at 77).




98. See Free v. Peters, 806 F.Supp. 705 (N.D. Il. 1992), affd in part, rev'd in part, 12
F.3d 700 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 967 (1994).
99. See Moore, 935 S.W.2d at 130.
100. See Soria v. State, 933 S.W.2d 46, 51-59 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
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State's or court's choosing .... ,,0o1 However, the defendant refused the
trial court's order to submit to an evaluation by the state's psychiatric
expert. Therefore, the trial court limited the defendant's expert testi-
mony to hypothetical questions as opposed to testimony regarding the
defendant. 10 2 The Court of Criminal Appeals found the sanction to be
fair, reasonable, and within the inherent authority of the court to control
the fairness of the proceedings. 10 3
F. FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS
In Turner v. Johnson, the Fifth Circuit interpreted the Supreme Court's
decision in McFarland v. Scott.10 4 Turner's conviction and sentence of
death had been affirmed by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.10 5 Two
state applications for writs of habeas corpus followed, and relief was de-
nied by the Court of Criminal Appeals. 10 6 Turner then filed a federal
habeas corpus petition and moved for a stay of execution and an eviden-
tiary hearing. 10 7 The United States District Court denied relief and de-
clined to issue a certificate of probable cause for appeal. 08 Turner filed a
notice of appeal and secured a stay.10 9
The Fifth Circuit ruled that Turner was not entitled to the appointment
of counsel or a stay order and that he had read McFarland too broadly.
The Court in Turner found that, "[t]he McFarland court was concerned
only with that period of time between the habeas petitioner's motion for
the appointment of counsel and the filing of the initial petition.110 A
comprehensive petition had already been filed in Turner, so the McFar-
land mandate was not applicable.""'
No evidentiary hearing was required, the court held, because Turner
had received a full and fair hearing in the state court and could not
demonstrate that a failure to hold a hearing would result in a miscarriage
of justice.112 Moreover, Turner could not show prejudice and cause for
failure to develop the desired facts in state court. 113 The court found
unpersuasive Turner's claim that he had inadequate time before the sec-
ond state evidentiary hearing to develop forensic evidence. 1 4 Since he
had not shown that his ability to subpoena witnesses or present exhibits
101. Id. at 57 (footnote omitted).
102. See id. at 59.
103. See id.
104. See Turner v. Johnson, 106 F.3d 1178 (5th Cir. 1997) (interpreting McFarland v.
Scott, 512 U.S. 849 (1994)).
105. See Turner v. State, 805 S.W.2d 423 (Tex. Crim. App.) (en banc), cert. denied, 502
U.S. 870 (1991).
106. See Ex Parte Turner, No. 26,853-01 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 7, 1994); Ex parte Tur-
ner, No. 26,853-02 (Tex. Crim. App. November 3, 1994).
107. See Turner, 106 F.3d at 1182.
108. See id.
109. See id.
110. Id. at 182-83 (footnote omitted).
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. See id. at 1184.
114. See id. at 1183.
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was impeded, his claim did not discredit the full and fair hearing that had
occurred at the state level.115
The court went on to observe that without a certificate of probable
cause, there was no federal jurisdiction because, in order to receive appel-
late review, there must be a substantial showing of the denial of a federal
right. 116 This means that "the issues presented are debatable among ju-
rists of reason. 1117 Following a substantive review of the issues raised by
Turner, the court denied his request for appointment of counsel and for
an evidentiary hearing.1 18 Finding no "indicia of merit," the application
for a certificate of probable cause was denied.1 19
III. PRETRIAL PROCEDURES-SIGNIFICANT DECISIONS
A. CHARGING INSTRUMENT
In Eastep v. State,120 the State filed a motion to amend the indictment
to delete the nine (of fifty) thefts that the defendant challenged as be-
yond the statute of limitations. The State's motion was granted ex parte,
and the defendant subsequently objected that he had not received proper
notice.' 2' A defendant must be given notice before any amendment is
made to an indictment. 122 The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the
conviction, holding that abandonment of the nine thefts did not constitute
an amendment. 123 The deletion of this material, the Court reasoned, did
not affect the substance of the indictment and therefore was not an
amendment to the indictment. 124
A motion to quash is appropriate when the instrument charging the
misdemeanor offense of failure to identify fails to allege that the defend-
ant knew that the person asking for identification was a police officer. 25
In Green v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that knowledge
that the person is a police officer is a requirement that must be specifi-
cally pled, even though the statute does not specify such knowledge as an
element.'2 6
B. DEFENSE EXPERTS FOR INDIGENT DEFENDANTS
The continuing problem of when and to what extent an indigent de-
115. See id. at 1184.
116. See id. at 1185-86.
117. Id. at 1186 (footnote omitted) (citing Drew v. Collins, 5 F.3d 93, 95 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 510 U.S. 1171 (1994) (citing Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983))).
118. See id. at 1190.
119. Id.
120. 941 S.W.2d 130, 132-34 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (en banc).
121. See id.
122. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 28.10 (Vernon 1979).
123. See Eastep, 941 S.W.2d at 135-36.
124. See id.
125. See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 38.02(a) (Vernon 1987) (providing that a "person
commits an offense if he intentionally refuses to give his name, residence address, or date
of birth to a peace officer who has lawfully arrested the person and requested the
information.").
126. 951 S.W.2d 3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (en banc).
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fendant is entitled to expert assistance under Ake v. Oklahoma127 was
also addressed by the Court of Criminal Appeals in the non-capital con-
text. The requirements of Ake v. Oklahoma had previously been ex-
tended to non-capital cases. 128
In Taylor v. State,129 the defendant was indicted and tried for aggra-
vated assault.' 30 The recovery of semen from the victim's clothing per-
mitted DNA typing. Since the State did not request DNA testing,
however, the indigent defendant moved for the appointment of a particu-
lar expert to perform the DNA tests. Although the trial court granted the
motion, it also ordered that the results be submitted to the court and the
State as well.' 3 ' The report's conclusion was that the defendant's DNA
matched the sample from the victim's clothing. In response to this report,
the defendant moved for a private expert to perform DNA testing, and
the motion was denied.132
The court of appeals affirmed the defendant's conviction, 133 reasoning
that the defendant was afforded the requested expert assistance and was
not entitled to a second expert simply because he did not care for the test
results.' 34 The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed on the ground that
the trial court and the court of appeals had wrongly characterized the
original expert as a defense expert. 35 Since her report was provided to
all parties, including the defendant's adversary, and the State then desig-
nated her as a witness for the State, she could not be characterized as a
defense expert because the scientific results were protected from disclo-
sure to the State by the work-product doctrine.1 36 The Court of Criminal
Appeals remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether the
defendant had been deprived of due process by a denial of his request for
an appointment of a private expert, a question dependent upon the com-
plexity of the issues and the importance of the expert testimony to a via-
ble defense. 137
C. SUBPOENAS
In Coleman v. State, the trial court granted the State's motion to quash
defense subpoenas to newspaper reporters.1 38 The Court of Criminal
Appeals held that the lower court erred in refusing the subpoenas, reiter-
127. 470 U.S. 68 (1971).
128. See e.g., McBride v. State, 838 S.W.2d 248, 252 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (en banc).
129. 939 S.W.2d 148 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (en banc).
130. See id.
131. See id. at 152.
132. See id.
133. See Taylor v. State, No. A14-92-00781-CR (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Dec.
1, 1994, pet. granted) (not designated for publication), 1994 WL 669173, at *1, vacated, 939
S.W.2d 148 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 9, 1996).
134. See id. at *2.
135. See Taylor, 939 S.W.2d at 153.
136. See id. at 152-53.
137. See id. at 151-53.
138. See Coleman v. State, No. 491-96, 1997 WL 209530 (Tex. Crim. App. Apr. 30,
1997) (en banc).
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ating its holding in Healey v. McMeans139 that there is no privilege that
allows newsmen to withhold relevant evidence. The Court enunciated
additional standards for assessing such subpoenas, noting that the mere
request for a subpoena is a prima facie showing of the materiality of the
witness' testimony, and that the burden is on the movant to show a basis
for quashing the subpoena."' 0 The movant must come forward with evi-
dence of immateriality.' 4 ' Upon a showing that the testimony is not ma-
terial, the burden of persuasion shifts to the party who issued the
subpoena to demonstrate that the testimony would be material.142 The
Court noted that the same standards apply to subpoenas duces tecum. 143
D. LIMITATIONS
In Ex Parte Matthews, the Court of Criminal Appeals rejected the
State's argument that the statute of limitations was tolled during the pe-
riod of the defendant's absence from the state.144 The Court held that the
plain language of article 12.05(a) 145 made it clear that absence from the
state does not toll the statute of limitations unless the absent person is
actually "accused" of a crime at the time.146 In Matthews, the defendant
left the state after the alleged perjury occurred. However, the perjury
was not discovered until after the statute of limitations had run. Since the
defendant was not actually charged with the crime during the period of
his absence, the exception to the limitations period set forth in article
12.05(a) did not apply. 147
E. JEOPARDY
In Stennett v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals, in a lengthy analy-
sis, held that payment of any part of a tax levy on seized marijuana or
another controlled substance constituted punishment under the double
jeopardy clause, and, accordingly, subsequent prosecution of the defend-
ant for possession of the controlled substance was barred.148
In Tharp v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the defend-
ant's loss of his driver's license because of the results of a breathalyzer
test was not punishment under the double jeopardy clause, and, there-
fore, subsequent prosecution for driving while under the influence was
not barred. 149
139. 884 S.W.2d 772 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (en banc).
140. See Coleman, 1997 WL 209530, at *4.
141. See id. at *4-5.
142. See id. at *5.
143. See id. at *3.
144. See Ex Parte Matthews, 933 S.W.2d 134 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (en banc).
145. TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 12.05(a) (Vernon 1994) provides that "[t]he
time during which the accused is absent from the state shall not be computed in the period
of limitation."
146. See Matthews, 933 S.W.2d at 137.
147. See id. at 138.
148. See Stennett v. State, 941 S.W.2d 914, 917 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (en banc).





During the Survey period, the Court of Criminal Appeals decided a
number of cases clarifying the appropriate scope of voir dire questioning
of prospective jurors and challenges for cause.
In Atkins v. State, the State was permitted, over objection, to ask mem-
bers of the jury panel whether anyone would be unable to convict a per-
son for possession of a residue quantity of cocaine. 150 Several persons
who doubted that they could convict in those circumstances were success-
fully challenged for cause. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that it
was improper to inquire how the veniremen would respond to particular
circumstances presented by a hypothetical question.' 51 Hypothetical
questions are permissible to explain the application of the law, provided
they are not used to commit the potential juror to a result under the spe-
cific facts of the case. 152 The Court characterized the State's questioning
as an improper effort to commit jurors to a conviction on the facts of this
case.
153
In Zinger v. State, the State was permitted to ask on voir dire whether
prospective jurors could convict "if you believed a witness beyond a rea-
sonable doubt .... ,,154 A prospective juror indicated that he could not
find proof beyond a reasonable doubt on the basis of only one witness's
testimony. The trial court sustained the State's challenge for cause, and
the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed. Appellant argued that the ju-
ror's response indicated "only that his threshold for reasonable doubt was
higher than the legal minimum to support a conviction, and this is permis-
sible under Garrett v. State .... -155 Without adopting this characteriza-
tion of the issue, the Court of Criminal Appeals nevertheless found that
the venireman's response was governed by Garrett, and was not grounds
for a challenge for cause. 156
In Yarborough v. State, the prosecutor defended a Batson157 challenge
to his peremptory strike of a minority member of the prospective jury
panel, on grounds of alleged negative body language that suggested to the
prosecutor that the person did not want to be on the jury.' 58 The trial
court allowed the peremptory strike.' 59 The court of appeals disagreed,
reversed the judgment and remanded for a new trial.160 The Court of
150. See Atkins v. State, 951 S.W.2d 787, 789 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (en banc).
151. See id. at 789.
152. See id. at 789-90.
153. See id.
154. Zinger v. State, 932 S.W.2d 511, 512 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996 (en banc).
155. Id. at 511 (citing Garrett v. State, 851 S.W.2d 853 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (en
banc)).
156. See id. at 511-14.
157. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
158. See Yarborough v. State, 947 S.W.2d 892, 893-94 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (en banc).
159. See id. at 894.
160. Yarborough v. State, 868 S.W.2d 913 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1994), rev'd 947
S.W.2d 892 (1997).
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Criminal Appeals granted the State's petition for discretionary review,
and concluded that the prosecutor's uncontradicted and unchallenged ob-
servations must be taken as true. 161 The Court also rejected a per se rule
that subjective evaluation must be substantiated by independent evi-
dence, as the court of appeals had held. 162 Thus, while subjective evalua-
tions may satisfy Batson, and there was a sufficient showing to defeat a
contention that the peremptory strike was per se a pretext, the Court of
Criminal Appeals reversed and remanded to the court of appeals for fur-
ther evaluation of the peremptory challenge. 163
In Fritz v. State,164 the defense objected to the prosecutor's peremptory
strike of seven males, since Batson principles apply to strikes based on
gender as well as race.165 The prosecutor's explanation was that he struck
males under age thirty to avoid bias or shared identity with the defend-
ant, who was a male under thirty. The Court of Criminal Appeals re-
versed the conviction because this explanation was not gender neutral.
166
B. JURY CHARGE
In Reyes v. State,167 the Court of Criminal Appeals resolved a dispute
among the courts of appeals about whether the failure to define reason-
able doubt, as mandated by Geesa v. State,168 is subject to a harmless
error analysis where the defendant has failed to object to the omission.169
In a four-four decision, with one judge concurring in the judgment and
suggesting that he might reexamine Geesa in the future, 170 the Court held
that omission of the definition of reasonable doubt is not subject to a
harmless error analysis, even though the defendant did not object at
trial.17' However, the concurrence, with its open invitation for a reexami-
nation of Geesa, indicates that the issue may not be settled.
In Mitchell v. State,172 the State introduced four extraneous crimes
against the defendant at the punishment phase of trial. The defendant
requested a jury instruction that required proof beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant had committed the crimes before they could be
considered by the jury.173 The trial court refused to give the requested
instruction. 174 The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the conviction on
161. See Yarborough, 947 S.W.2d at 985.
162. See id. at 895-96
163. See id. at 896.
164. 946 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (en banc).
165. See id. at 844 (referring to J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994)).
166. See Fritz, 946 S.W.2d at 847.
167. 938 S.W.2d 718 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (en banc).
168. 820 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (en banc).
169. See Reyes, 938 S.W.2d at 721.
170. See id. at 721-22 (Meyers, J., concurring).
171. See id. at 721.
172. 931 S.W.2d 950 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (en banc).
173. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN., art. 37.07, § 3(a) (Vernon Supp. 1997) (requir-
ing the admission of extraneous uncharged crimes at punishment, provided such crimes or
acts are proved beyond a reasonable doubt to have been committed by the defendant).
174. See Mitchell, 931 S.W.2d at 951.
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the ground that such an instruction must be given any time it is re-
quested. 175 Such instructions have been required at the guilt phase of
trial since 1994.176 It is now clear that the same requirement applies to
the introduction of extraneous crime evidence at the punishment phase.
In Arevalo v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the state
must meet the same test as a defendant in order to receive a lesser, in-
cluded offense instruction. 177 Under the Aguilar test, an offense is a
lesser included offense and an instruction is permitted if it meets the cri-
teria set forth in article 37.09,178 and if there is some evidence in the rec-
ord that the defendant, if guilty, is guilty only of the lesser offense. 179
The defendant in Arevalo was indicted and tried for aggravated assault.
At the close of trial, however, the State requested a lesser, included of-
fense instruction on sexual assault, because it believed its case had certain
weaknesses. The court gave a lesser, included offense instruction, even
though the defendant objected that the evidence did not support the
lesser, included offense.180 The jury found the defendant guilty of sexual
assault.181
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. 182 It ruled that
the lesser, included offense instruction was appropriate, reasoning that
the State implicitly alleges all lesser, included offenses when it alleges the
primary offense, and the State should receive a lesser, included offense
instruction any time it requests one. 183 The court of appeals imposed no
requirement that the State meet the same test that a defendant must meet
in order to receive a lesser, included offense instruction. 184 The Court of
Criminal Appeals disagreed, and held that the State must meet the same
test as the defense.185
175. See id. at 954.
176. See George v. State, 890 S.W.2d 73, 76 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (en banc).
177. See Arevalo v. State, 943 S.W.2d 887, 890 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (en banc).
178. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN., art. 37.09 (Vernon 1981), which provides:
An offense is a lesser included offense if:
(1) it is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required
to establish the commission of the offense charged;
(2) it differs from the offense charged only in the respect that a less serious
injury or risk of injury to the same person, property, or public interest suf-
fices to establish its commission;
(3) it differs from the offense charged only in the respect that a less culpa-
ble mental state suffices to establish its commission; or
(4) it consists of an attempt to commit the offense charged or an otherwise
included offense.
179. See Aguilar v. State, 682 S.W.2d 556, 558 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (en banc).
180. See Arevalo, 943 S.W.2d at 887.
181. See id.
182. See id. at 888.
183. See id.
184. See id.
185. See id. at 889-90.
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V. APPEAL
A. GUILTY PLEA APPEALS
In an attempt to clarify a confusing area of the law, the Court of Crimi-
nal Appeals recently addressed the right to appeal a guilty plea where the
voluntariness of the plea is attacked. In Flowers v. State,186 the Court
held that in plea bargain cases, defendants may challenge the voluntari-
ness of the plea without complying with the special provisions of Rule
40(b)(1) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. 187
Flowers entered into a plea agreement, and pled no contest to the
charge of indecency with a child. The plea agreement contained the fol-
lowing provisions: (1) a sentence of three years confinement; (2) a fine of
$1,000; and (3) a promise that the State would recommend probation. It
remained silent on Flowers' application for deferred adjudication.' 8 8 The
trial court accepted the plea, sentenced Flowers in accordance with the
plea agreement, and required that Flowers serve 180 days in jail as a con-
dition of probation.' 8 9
Flowers gave notice of appeal, but failed to comply with Texas Rule of
Appellate Procedure 40(b)(1). In the court of appeals, Flowers argued
that his plea was involuntary because the trial court did not admonish
him properly concerning the conditions of probation and because his trial
counsel specifically informed him he would not receive jail time.190
186. 935 S.W.2d 131 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (en banc).
187. See id. at 134. See also TEX. R. App. P. 40(b)(1), (Vernon 1986, amended 1990).
(b) Appeals in Criminal Cases.
(1) Appeal is perfected in a criminal case by giving timely notice of ap-
peal; except, it is unnecessary to give notice of appeal in death penalty cases.
Notice of appeal shall be given in writing filed with the clerk of the trial
court. Such notice shall be sufficient if it shows the desire of the defendant to
appeal from the judgment or other appealable order; but if the judgment was
rendered upon his plea of guilty or nolo contendere pursuant to Article 1.15,
Code of Criminal Procedure, and the punishment assessed does not exceed
the punishment recommended by the prosecutor and agreed to by the de-
fendant and his attorney, in order to prosecute an appeal for a nonjurisdic-
tional defect or error that occurred prior to entry of the plea the notice shall
state that the trial court granted permission to appeal or shall specify that
those matters were raised by written motion and ruled on before trial. The
clerk of the trial court shall note on copies of the notice of appeal the
number of the cause and the day that notice was filed, and shall immediately
send one copy to the clerk of the appropriate court of appeals and one copy
to the attorney for the State.
Id.
188. Deferred Adjudication is a form of probation where no finding of guilt is entered.
See TEX. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 42.12, § 5(a) (Vernon Supp. 1998) which states:
(a) Except as provided by Subsection (d) of this section, when in the
judge's opinion the best interest of society and the defendant will be served,
the judge may, after receiving a plea of guilty or plea of nolo contendere,
hearing the evidence, and finding that it substantiates the defendant's guilt,
defer further proceedings without entering an adjudication of guilt, and place
the defendant on community supervision.
189. See Flowers, 935 S.W.2d at 131.
190. See id. at 132.
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The court of appeals dismissed Flowers appeal, concluding that it
lacked jurisdiction because his notice of appeal did not comply with Rule
40(b)(1). 191 The court of appeals further held that the issue of the volun-
tariness of the plea was not a jurisdictional issue, so as to exempt Flowers
from compliance with Rule 40(b)(1). 192
The Court of Criminal Appeals, in a per curiam opinion, held that, in
Texas, a defendant has always been able to appeal his conviction based on
a plea of guilty or nolo contendere on the basis that it was not freely and
voluntarily entered. 193 In reaching this conclusion, the Court discussed
the Helms rule that applied to appeals from guilty pleas without a plea
agreement. 194 This rule provides that "when a guilty plea is voluntarily
and understandingly made, all nonjurisdictional defects that occurred
prior to the entry of the guilty plea, including claimed deprivations of
federal due process, are waived."'1 95 The Helms rule applies to pleas of
guilty and nolo contendere entered without a plea bargain. 96 However,
the Court in Flowers stated that, by its very terms, the Helms rule does
not apply to bar appeal in a non-plea agreement case in which a defend-
ant claims the plea was involuntary. 197
In determining whether a defendant had the right to appeal in plea
bargain cases where he claims his plea was involuntary, the Court ex-
amined the predecessor to Rule 40(b)(1)-article 44.02 of the Texas Code
of Criminal Procedure. 198 The Court stated that article 44.02 permitted
appeals on "jurisdictional issues, matters raised prior to trial by written
motion, and issues the trial court permitted to be raised."'199 The Flowers
court additionally noted that article 44.02 did not expressly include the
right to raise jurisdictional issues, but stated that the Court had inter-
preted it to include this appellate right.200 Under Flowers and the cases
cited therein, defendants may appeal based on the voluntariness of the
plea in both pleas with and without plea agreements.
191. See Flowers v. State, No. 04-94-00577-CR, 1995 WL 570579 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio, Sept. 29, 1995), vacated by 935 S.W.2d 131 (1996).
192. See id.
193. See Flowers, 935 S.W.2d at 134.
194. See id. at 132 (citing Helms v. State, 484 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972)).
195. Id.
196. See id. at 133.
197. See id.
198. See id. See also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.02 (Vernon 1979), which
stated:
provided, however, before the defendant who has been convicted upon
either his plea of guilty or plea of nolo contendere before the court and the
court, upon the election of the defendant, assesses punishment and the pun-
ishment does not exceed the punishment recommended by the prosecutor
and agreed to by the defendant and his attorney may prosecute his appeal, he
must have permission of the trial court, except on those matters which have
been raised by written motion filed prior to trial.
Id. This provision was replaced on September 1, 1986, with TEX. R. APP. P. 40(b)(1).
199. Flowers, 935 S.W.2d at 133.
200. See id.
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Finding that Rule 40(b)(1), which replaced article 44.02, did not change
this rule, the Court stated that appeals in plea bargain cases governed by
Rule 40(b)(1) may challenge the voluntary nature of the plea.20 1
B. MISSING EXHIBITS
The issues of whether exhibits are part of the statement of facts or the
transcript and the effect of a lost exhibit on appeal were addressed in
Melendez v. State.20 2 The Court concluded that exhibits are part of the
statement of facts, and when a complete statement of facts is requested
by a defendant, the court reporter is required to include all admitted
exhibits. 20
3
Melendez attempted to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to
support his conviction in the court of appeals when it was determined
that three of the eight exhibits admitted at the guilt stage were missing.
Since the parties could not agree on a substitution of the exhibits, the
court of appeals reversed the judgment20 4 and remanded for a new trial in
accordance with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 50(e). 20 5 In reaching
this conclusion, the court of appeals concluded that an appellate court
cannot review sufficiency of the evidence without a complete statement
of facts and that the exhibits are part of the statement of facts.
20 6
Having determined that the exhibits are a portion of the statement of
facts, the court determined that, upon timely request for a complete state-
ment of facts, a defendant has exercised the required diligence to have
the exhibits made a part of the appellate record. Under Texas Rule of
Appellate Procedure 50(e) he is therefore entitled to a new trial when
portions of the statement of facts, including exhibits, are lost or destroyed
without his fault.20 7
Melendez was charged with possession with intent to deliver cocaine.
In the arguments before the court of appeals on the sufficiency question,
both sides relied on testimony concerning evidentiary matter gathered at
the scene, particularly sticks of gum in wrappers found in Melendez's car
and a gum wrapper containing three plastic baggies of cocaine on the
201. See id. at 134.
202. 936 S.W.2d 287 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (en banc).
203. See id. at 292.
204. See Melendez v. State, 902 S.W.2d 28, 30 (Tex. App.-Houston (1st Dist.) 1995,
rev. granted).
205. TEx. R. App. P. 50(e) (Vernon 1986, amended 1997) stated at the time:
(e) LOST OR DESTROYED RECORD. When the record or any portion
thereof is lost or destroyed it may be substituted in the trial court and when
so substituted the record may be prepared and transmitted to the appellate
court as in other cases. If the appellant has made a timely request for a
statement of facts, but the court reporter's notes and records have been lost
or destroyed without appellant's fault, the appellant is entitled to a new trial
unless the parties agree on a statement of facts.
These rules have been replaced with the new Rules of Appellate Procedure effective Sep-
tember 1, 1997.
206. See Melendez, 936 S.W.2d at 290.
207. See id. at 295.
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ground next to the rear passenger door of a patrol car nearby. When
these exhibits were determined to be missing, the court of appeals was
unable to compare the exhibits to determine whether the jury could find
beyond a reasonable doubt that the two gum wrappers were from the
same pack of gum. Finding that Melendez had exercised diligence in his
efforts to have the exhibits before the court for appellate review, the
court ordered a new trial under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure
50(e).208 The Court of Criminal Appeals, finding the court of appeals'
decision correct, affirmed the granting of the new trial.209
C. PROPER SUFFICIENCY REVIEW
Overruling a long line of cases and finding stare decisis an insufficient
reason to avoid such a departure in the law, the Court recently formu-
lated new rules for measuring the sufficiency of the evidence. In Malik v.
State,210 the Court overruled Benson v. State,211 Boozer v. State,212 and
Arceneaux v. State.213
The Benson-Boozer line of cases held that the sufficiency of the evi-
dence is measured by the jury charge if that charge is more favorable to
the defendant than the law requires and the state fails to object. 214
Benson held that the sufficiency of the evidence is measured by the
indictment as incorporated into the jury charge. 215 The Benson court
held that the State's failure to object to an unnecessary narrowing in the
jury charge of the descriptive element of the offense meant that the State
was required to prove the element as described, and a failure to do so
would result in an acquittal due to insufficient evidence.21 6 In Boozer,
the Court held that by failing to object to an erroneously submitted ac-
complice witness instruction, the State acquiesced in an increase of its
burden of proof.217
Malik was charged with unlawfully carrying a weapon. The jury charge
stated that the jury was required to find beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant was driving his vehicle in a suspicious manner before they
could consider the pistol or holster that was found in the car after being
stopped. The jury charge then erroneously stated that if the jury failed to
find this fact beyond a reasonable doubt they were to find Malik not
guilty.218
The Court of Criminal Appeals found that under the Benson-Boozer
208. See id. at 293-94.
209. See id. at 296.
210. 953 S.W.2d 234 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (en banc).
211. 661 S.W.2d 708 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (opinion on State's second motion for re-
hearing), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1219 (1984).
212. 717 S.W.2d 608 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (en banc).
213. 803 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
214. See Malik, 953 S.W.2d at 235.
215. See Benson, 661 S.W.2d at 715.
216. See id. at 715-16.
217. See Boozer, 717 S.W.2d at 610-12.
218. See Malik, 953 S.W.2d at 235-36.
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line of cases, and particularly State v. Arceneaux,219 the evidence was in-
sufficient.220 "In Arceneaux, the jury charge contained an instruction re-
quiring the jury to find 'beyond a reasonable doubt that the exhibit
introduced in evidence by the State [was] cocaine' before the defendant
could be convicted. ' 221 By failing to object to the cocaine instruction, the
State assumed the unnecessary burden to offer the cocaine into evidence.
Because no cocaine had been introduced, the evidence was found insuffi-
cient to sustain the guilty verdict.222
The Court found the instruction in Malik to be similar to that in
Arceneaux. 223 Both turned upon the status of a particular piece of evi-
dence, and both improperly raised the State's burden of proof.224 The
Court therefore concluded that following Arceneaux would require
reversal. 225
Rather than following the Arceneaux and Benson-Boozer line of cases
and finding the evidence insufficient, the Court in Malik overruled the
entire set of authorities and formulated a new rule for measuring suffi-
ciency of evidence. 226 In reaching its conclusion, the Court found that the
Benson-Boozer line of cases failed to produce consistency in the law, and
that the rule of these cases regularly produced results unanticipated by
the constitutional doctrine on which it was based.227
The Court found that Benson and Boozer had erroneously relied upon
federal constitutional precedent, which, in fact, did not support the
rule.228 The federal constitutional standard for reviewing sufficiency of
the evidence is that of Jackson v. Virginia229 that the Malik court found
not to support the Benson-Boozer rule.230 Under Jackson, the sufficiency
review question is "whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found
the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. ''231 The
Court in Malik held that "[i]f an element to be proved is incorporated
into the charge merely because the State failed to object, and hence, un-
necessarily increased its burden of proof, then that element cannot be an
'essential' element of the crime. '232
The Malik court also stated that the Supreme Court has never imposed
on any jurisdiction a requirement to measure the sufficiency of the evi-
219. 803 S.W.2d 267 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
220. See Malik, 953 S.W.2d at 235.
221. Id.
222. See id.
223. See id. at 235-36.
224. See id. at 236.
225. See id.
226. See id. at 239-40.
227. See id. at 239.
228. See id.
229. 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
230. See Malik, 953 S.W.2d at 239.
231. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319 (citations omitted).
232. Malik, 953 S.W.2d at 237.
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dence by the jury charge.2 33 The Court concluded that "the Benson
Boozer rule is based upon a misinterpretation of federal constitutional
precedent, results in complex and inconsistent standards for reviewing
sufficiency of the evidence, and is fundamentally at odds with the purpose
behind the Jackson standard of sufficiency review. '2 34 Based on this, the
Court held that the sufficiency of the evidence will no longer be measured
by the jury charge actually given.2 35
In replacing the Benson-Boozer rule, the Court recognized that mea-
suring sufficiency by the indictment is an inadequate substitute because
some important issues relating to sufficiency, such as the law of parties
and transferred intent, are not contained in the indictment.2 36 Therefore,
the new rule is to measure sufficiency of the evidence "by the elements of
the offense as defined by the hypothetically correct jury charge for the
case."'237 According to the Court, such a charge would be one that "accu-
rately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unneces-
sarily increase the State's burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the
State's theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular of-
fense for which the defendant was tried. '238
D. COLLATERAL ATTACKS RAISING ACTUAL INNOCENCE
In State v. ex rel. Holmes v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that exe-
cution of an innocent person would violate the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the U. S. Constitution.239 In Holmes, the
Court announced that it would begin to entertain post conviction applica-
tions for writs of habeas corpus alleging actual innocence as an independ-
ent ground for such relief.240
In Ex parte Elizondo,241 the Court extended this holding, determining
that the Due Process Clause also forbids incarceration of an innocent per-
son, and stating that post conviction habeas corpus challenges raising ac-
tual innocence would also be considered in non-death penalty cases. 242
The standard announced in Holmes was that "in order to be entitled to
relief on a claim of factual innocence the applicant must show that based
on the newly discovered evidence and the entire record before the jury
that convicted him, no rational trier of fact could find proof of guilt be-
yond a reasonable doubt. '243 It was under this standard that Elizondo
233. See id. at 238.
234. Id. at 239.
235. See id.
236. See id.
237. Id. at 240.
238. Id.
239. See State v. ex rel. Holmes v. Court of Appeals, 885 S.W.2d 389, 391 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1994) (en banc).
240. See id. at 398-99.
241. 947 S.W.2d 202 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (en banc).
242. See id. at 204-05.
243. Holmes, 885 S.W.2d at 399.
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brought his post conviction application for writ of habeas corpus. 244
Elizondo was convicted of aggravated sexual assault based solely on
the testimony of his stepson, one of the alleged victims in the case. Thir-
teen years later, when the stepson and the other victim were grown, they
both gave statements that the stepson's testimony was false and that
Elizondo did not commit the offense. 245
In reviewing whether to grant post conviction relief to Elizondo and
others claiming actual innocence, the Court explained the application of
the standard set out in Holmes.246 The Court stated that an application
for habeas relief based on a claim of actual innocence must "'demonstrate
that the newly discovered evidence, if true, creates a doubt as to the effi-
cacy of the verdict sufficient to undermine confidence in the verdict and
that it is probable that the verdict would be different [on retrial]."' 247
The Court stated that the traditional sufficiency review under Jackson
v. Virginia,248 was inappropriate for this type of review, and that the
Court's job "is not to review the jury's verdict but to decide whether the
newly discovered evidence would have convinced the jury of applicant's
innocence. " 249
In further elucidating this standard, the Court discussed the U.S.
Supreme Court cases of Schiup v. Delo250 and Herrera v. Collins.251 In
Herrera, the Supreme Court dealt with a claim that execution of a person
who was actually innocent violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments.252 "In Schiup v. Delo,... the petitioner raised actual innocence in
an effort to bring himself within the 'narrow class of cases' implicating
fundamental miscarriage of justice as an exception to a showing of cause
and prejudice for failure to raise [a habeas] claim in an earlier writ. '253
Schlup's claim of innocence did not alone provide a claim for relief, but
was tied to a showing of constitutional error at trial.254 Herrera's claim of
actual innocence had nothing to do with the proceedings that led to his
conviction, rather he simply claimed that execution of an innocent person
would violate the Eighth Amendment.255
The Supreme Court applied a lesser burden to Schlup's evidence of
innocence than to Herrera's. 256 Following this theory, the Court of Crim-
inal Appeals in Elizondo stated that in claims of actual innocence that are
not accompanied by a claim of constitutional error at trial, the habeas
244. See Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d at 205 (citing Holmes, 885 S.W.2d at 398).
245. See id. at 209-10.
246. See id. at 206.
247. Id. (citing Holmes, 885 S.W.2d at 398).
248. See supra note 229.
249. Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d at 207.
250. 513 U.S. 298 (1995).
251. 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
252. See id. at 398.
253. Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d at 208.





courts must be convinced that the new facts unquestionably establish in-
nocence.257 This standard means that the petitioner must show, by clear
and convincing evidence, that no reasonable juror would have convicted
him in light of the new evidence.258 By contrast, when a claim of actual
innocence is accompanied by a claim that the trial was infected with some
other constitutional error, there is a lesser burden. In this situation, if the
habeas court were merely convinced that the new facts raised sufficient
doubt about the petitioner's innocence, so as to undermine confidence in
the outcome of the trial without the assurance that the trial was untainted
by constitutional error, then this threshold showing of innocence would
justify a review of the merits of the other constitutional claims.259
In Elizondo the claim was one of actual innocence based on newly dis-
covered evidence. No other constitutional claim was before the Court.
The Court found the standard for granting a new trial to be met, and
stated "we think that another jury hearing the evidence, including the
newly discovered mature recantation of Robert's juvenile testimony,
would view the new evidence as mbre credible and would acquit [sic.]
applicant. ' 260 The Court stated that they were convinced by clear and
convincing evidence that no rational jury would convict Elizondo in light
of the new evidence, and granted him relief.261
E. PRETRIAL APPEAL BY THE STATE
The State has a right to appeal a pretrial order granting a motion to
suppress evidence.2 62 In State v. Roberts, the Court of Criminal Appeals
made it clear that this right of pretrial appeal applies only to motions to
suppress illegally obtained evidence.263 The right of appeal does not arise
if the exclusion of evidence is on other grounds. 264
In Roberts, the defendant filed a "motion to suppress" former testi-
mony of a complaining witness at a civil deposition. The trial court re-
jected the State's argument that the deposition testimony was admissible
as "former testimony" under Texas Rule of Criminal Evidence 804(b)(1).
The State appealed. The fact that the defendant had labelled his motion
a "motion to suppress" was of no import, the Court reasoned, because
the State's right to appeal adverse rulings on motions to suppress applies
only to motions that seek suppression of illegally obtained evidence. 265
Thus, the Court held that the State could not appeal the trial court's
ruling.266
257. See id. at 209.
258. See id.
259. See id. at 208.
260. Id. at 210.
261. See id.
262. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.01(a)(5) (Vernon Supp. 1997).
263. See State v. Roberts, 940 S.W.2d 655, 660 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (en banc).
264. See id.
265. See id. at 660.
266. See id.
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